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Systemic risk measures: the simpler the better? 
María Rodríguez-Moreno and Juan Ignacio Peña
1 
Introduction 
The financial system plays a fundamental role in the global economy as the middleman 
between agents who need to borrow and agents who are willing to lend or invest. As a 
consequence, it is naturally linked to all economic sectors and, therefore, if the financial 
system does not work properly, its problems have a strong impact on the real economy. We 
can see this in the deteriorating fundamental macro variables of the United States and 
Europe, including GDP growth rate, unemployment rates and government deficits. 
Many of these problems come from events related to systemic risk, extending from the 
banking sector to the real economy. Thus, it is important to understand the available 
measures of systemic risk and their relationships with one another in order to show later an 
indicator of their relative usefulness. This article aims to shed some light on these pressing 
issues by means of an empirical analysis of the most widely used and best known measures 
of systemic risk employed by investors and regulators worldwide. 
In this paper, we concentrate on what are widely acknowledged to be the most important 
systemic actors: the biggest banks in the two biggest economic areas (Western Europe and 
the United States).
2 Using daily data, we construct and compare a comprehensive set of 
measures for these major actors. Specifically, we compute six different sets of systemic risk 
measures for a sample of the 20 biggest European and 13 biggest US banks from 
January 2004 to November 2009.
3 The six measures are based on (i) principal components 
of the bank’s credit default swaps (CDS); (ii) interbank interest rates; (iii) structural credit risk 
models (Merton (1973)); (iv) collateralised debt obligation (CDO) indices and their tranches; 
(v) multivariate densities computed from CDS spreads; and (vi) co-risk measures. Unlike 
previous studies, we do not focus on just one market (stock market) to compute our 
measures, but use data from several markets: stock, credit and derivatives markets. Then, 
we run a “horse race” to evaluate the usefulness of these measures on the basis of three 
different criteria: (i) Granger Causality tests; (ii) Gonzalo and Granger metric; and 
(iii) McFadden R-squared. Finally, we run some additional checks to verify the robustness of 
the “horse race” results.  
Our results imply that the best-performing measures of systemic risk are based on simple 
indicators obtained from credit derivatives and interbank rates. Measures based on complex 
models or convoluted statistical procedures do not perform particularly well in our sample. It 
seems that “model risk” is an issue when developing appropriate measures of systemic risk. 
Therefore, the implication for investors and regulators looking for reliable systemic risk 
indicators is to stick to simple, robust indicators based on credit derivatives and on interest 
rates data from the market. 
                                                  
1  Department of Business Administration, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
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engage in banking functions. 
3  In a recent study, the International Monetary Fund (2009) posits that smaller institutions may also contribute to 
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Systemic risk measures 
In this section, we briefly summarise the systemic risk measures proposed in the literature, 
which are based on market information. 
  Principal Component Analysis (PCA): CDS are credit derivatives that provide 
insurance against the risk of default of a certain company and, hence, their spreads 
measure the risk that is faced by bondholders of the reference entity. We perform a 
PCA on a pool of CDS spreads and consider the first principal component as a 
systemic risk measure because it is the common factor that is driving the CDS 
spreads, and the nature of such spreads should be reflecting the common risk of 
default.  
  LIBOR spreads: this group of measures involves the use of LIBOR
4 as the reference 
interest rate relative to either the Overnight Interest Swap (OIS) or treasury bills 
(TBILLs). These two proxies of systemic risk are similar, but important conceptual 
differences exist between them. The LIBOR-OIS spread reflects liquidity and default 
risk over the following months while the LIBOR-TBILL spread captures not only 
liquidity and default risk but also the additional fact that, during periods of turmoil, 
investors lend against treasury bills (the best form of collateral), measuring the “flight 
to quality” effect.  
  Structural model: the third group of measures is based on the framework of Merton’s 
model (1973). The basic reference is Lehar (2005), although other authors use 
similar approaches. Lehar (2005) proposes a systemic risk measure based on the 
probability of default of a given proportion of banks in a given financial system. The 
probability of default is linked to the relationship between the banks’ asset value and 
their liabilities. In summary, the procedure for estimating this variable consists of 
recovering the bank’s asset portfolio and correlations through Merton’s model and 
an Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) model, respectively. Then a 
simulation is carried out to infer the banks’ future asset portfolio and compare it with 
their liabilities according to different criteria, in order to construct two systemic risk 
indexes: SIV and SIN, which refer to a systemic risk index based on the expected 
value of bank’s asset portfolio and a systemic risk index based on the expected 
number of defaulted banks, respectively. 
  CDO indexes and tranches: some authors used CDOs to estimate systemic risk 
measures. We base this group of measures on Bhansali, Gingrich and Longstaff’s 
(2008) paper. They extract the idiosyncratic, sector-wide and economy-wide, or 
systemic risk components from US (CDX) and European (iTraxx) prices of indexed 
credit derivatives by means of a linearised three-jump model. In summary, they 
calibrate the model to both the CDO indexes and their tranches. They then break 
down the CDO indexes into three different spreads.  
  Multivariate Density: Another set of measures assesses systemic risk by recovering 
the multivariate density of an analysed portfolio. Within this line, we follow 
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009), who propose a set of banking stability measures 
based on distress dependence, which is estimated by the Banking System 
Multivariate Density (BSMD). BSMD is the key element for measuring banking 
stability and is estimated by means of Consistent Information Multivariate Density 
Optimizing (CIMDO) methodology (see Segoviano (2006)). Once the BSMD is 
recovered, the authors propose two measures for common distress in the banking 
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system: the joint probability of distress (JPoD), which represents the probability of all 
banks in the portfolio becoming distressed, and the Banking Stability Index (BSI), 
which represents the expected number of institutions to become distressed, 
conditional on the fact that at least one institution has become distressed. However, 
the estimation of the BSMD becomes harder as we increase the number of banks 
under analysis. To overcome this problem, we analyse this measure using “reduced 
portfolios” according to three criteria: (i) level of CDS spread; (ii) level of liabilities; 
and (iii) level of the liabilities over market value ratio. That is, for each period of time, 
we choose three banks which are at the top of each classification and estimate the 
corresponding BSMD.  
  “Co-risk management” tools: the last set of systemic risk measures are based on the 
traditional risk management tools such as value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall 
(ES). Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) propose estimating institution i’s co-value-at-
risk (CoVaRi) as the whole system’s (ie, portfolio’s) VaRs conditioned on institution i 
being in distress (ie being at its unconditional VaRi level). On the basis of CoVaR, 
they calculate the marginal contribution of institution i to the overall systemic risk as 
the difference between CoVaR and the unconditional whole system’s VaR, which is 
denoted as Delta Co-Value-at-Risk (ΔCoVarRi). Therefore, ΔCoVarRi allows us to 
determine how much an institution adds to overall systemic risk. Then, we add the 
ΔCoVarRi of each institution using two different criteria, equally weighted, and 
weighted by market capitalisation. Additionally, we apply the “co-risk” methodology 
to the ES through the quantile regression.  
Horse race 
In this section, we choose the most informative variables within each group, by regressing 
the measures against the influential events that have marked the main episodes of the crisis. 
Then we rank the systemic risk measures according to their performance in the Granger 
causality test, the Gonzalo and Granger metric and the McFadden R-squared. 
To choose the most informative variables about systemic risk, we use the Influential Events 
Variable (IEV). This is a dummy variable which equals 1 on a date when there is important 
systemic news during the financial crisis and is equal to 0 otherwise. This variable covers a 
wide variety of events such as: bankruptcies (financial and non-financial firms), substantial 
firms’ losses, stock market downturns, takeovers among financial institutions, and 
nationalisations or bail-outs among others. Then, we run logistic regressions, using each 
systemic risk measure as an explanatory variable, and choose the systemic risk measures 
with the highest average McFadden R-squared. Table 1 summarises the selected systemic 
risk measures for those groups in which there is more than one proposed measure.  
In order to rank the selected variables across groups within each economic area, we employ 
three criteria: (i) Granger causality test; (ii) Gonzalo and Granger metric; and (iii) McFadden 
R-squared. The first criterion gives information on the very important issue of which market 
provides the leading indicator. Having reliable early indicators is of crucial importance for 
market agents and especially for regulators.
5 The second and third criteria relate, from 
                                                  
5  As documented in Sorkin (2010), on 5 June 2007, none other than the Fed chairman Ben Bernanke said, “At 
this point the troubles in the subprime sector seem unlikely to seriously spill over to the broader economy or 
the financial system.” To be fair, not only regulators appear strikingly short-sighted, but academics as well 
deserve a mention. For instance, in a paper on measures of systemic risk published in the Journal of Financial 
Economics (available online, edition 3 July 2007), Bartram, Brown and Hund (2007) said that “the distress of 
central bankers, regulators and politicians about the events (systemic risk) we study could be overstated and 
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different perspectives, to each measure with an unobservable component, that is, the 
underlying  systemic risk trend in the economy. In the Gonzalo and Granger metric, we 
compare, by pairs of measures, the contribution of each measure to the unobserved 
component, while by means of the McFadden R-squared, we measure the relationship 
between each measure and the IEV which is a proxy for the main systemic events of the 
current crisis. 
(i)  Granger causality test: the first classification is based on the Granger causality test 
(Granger (1969)). This test intuitively examines whether past changes in one 
variable, Xt, help to explain contemporary changes in another variable, Yt. If not, we 
conclude that Xt does not Grange-cause Yt. We carry out the Granger causality test 
by pairs of measures within each economic area. To rank the measures, we give a 
score of +1 to measure X if X Granger causes another measure, Y, and we give a 
score of –1 to measure X if X is caused in the Granger sense by Y. The best 
measure receives the highest positive score and the worst measure the highest 
negative score.
6 
(ii)  Gonzalo and Granger metric: the second classification is based on the Gonzalo and 
Granger (1995) (GG) metric. This analysis allows us to determine, by pairs of 
measures, the relative contribution of each measure to the unobserved factor that is 
the driving force in the cointegration relationship. In our framework we define that 
unobserved factor as the systemic risk common trend in the economy. To rank the 
estimated measures we make use of the fact that the GG metric is bounded 
between 0 and 1. We assign a score of +1 to measure X if X contributes more to the 
systemic risk common trend factor (ie its GG metric is larger than 0.5) than the 
measure Y, which is assigned –1, and we assign a score of –1 to measure X and a 
score of +1 to measure Y otherwise. 
(iii)  McFadden R-squared: previously, we made use of the logistic and multinomial 
regressions against the Influential Event Variable (IEV) to rule out those variables 
which provide less information about the systemic events within each group of 
measures. In this case, we rank the systemic risk measures by pairs, assigning a 
score of +1 to the measure with the highest R-squared and –1 to the one with the 
lowest R-squared. 
Table 2 summarises the ranking scores according to the specified criterion. For the 
European market, the best indicator is the LIBOR-OIS spread followed by the first principal 
component of the single-name CDS whereas the least reliable indicator is the ΔCoESi. For 
the US market, the best indicator is the first principal component of the single-name CDS 
followed by the LIBOR-TBILL spread, whereas the least reliable indicator is the ΔCoVarRi.  
Additionally, we conduct robustness tests to show the consistency of the results. It can be 
argued that assigning the same weight to all the events, irrespective of their potential severity 
and impact on the financial system, may bias the results. To deal with this possible problem, 
we employ an alternative definition of the dependent variable: instead of using only two 
values (ie 1 or 0), we decompose the IEV variable into four different levels, in accordance 
with the event’s severity. The multinomial Logit regression outcomes are not materially 
                                                                                                                                                      
that current policy responses to financial crises could be adequate to handle major macroeconomic events.” 
Spot on. 
6  This ranking procedure is related to the well-known Condorcet voting method. The Marquis de Condorcet, a 
prominent reformer who became a secretary of the revolutionary French National Assembly in 1791, 
suggested dividing elections into a series of one-on-one contests, so that every candidate is directly compared 
with every other. If there is a candidate who wins every such match, it is clear who should be the overall 
winner of the tournament. However to avoid some of the problems of the Condorcet approach we also allow 
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different from the ones obtained using a standard Logit regression. On the other hand, it can 
also be argued that the Granger causality test is designed to handle pairs of variables, and 
could produce misleading results when the true relationship involves three or more variables. 
To deal with this criticism, we run a VAR equation in which we consider the six selected 
systemic risk measures by economic area and establish a ranking score according to the 
significant coefficients. Those scores are broadly in agreement with the Granger causality 
test in both portfolios.  
Conclusion 
In this paper, we compute six different sets of systemic risk measures for a sample of 
European and US banks from January 2004 to November 2009. The six measures are based 
on (i) principal components of the banks’ credit default swaps; (ii) interbank interest rates; 
(iii) structural credit risk models; (iv) collateralised debt obligation indexes and their tranches; 
(v) multivariate densities computed from CDS spreads; and (vi) co-risk (CoVaR) measures. 
We then compare them using three different criteria: (i) Granger causality tests; (ii) the 
Gonzalo and Granger metric; and (iii) their relation to an index of systemic events. We find 
that for the European market, the best indicator is the LIBOR-OIS spread followed by the 
principal component of the single-name CDS, whereas the least reliable indicator is the 
equally weighted Delta Co-Expected Shortfall. For the US market, the best indicator is the 
first principal component of the single-name CDS followed by the LIBOR-TBILL spread, 
whereas the least reliable indicator is the equally weighted Delta-Co-Value-at-Risk. 
Therefore, our results imply that the best-performing measures of systemic risk are based on 
simple indicators obtained from credit derivatives and interbank rates. On the other hand, 
indicators relying on complex statistical procedures or questionable assumptions do not 
perform particularly well in our sample. The implications for investors and regulators are 
straightforward: look for simple, robust indicators based directly on liquid market prices of 
credit-sensitive instruments; beware of overcomplicated modelling based on dubious 
assumptions; and avoid inferences from the prices of financial products traded in thin 





Selected measures by group 
 LIBOR  spreads  Structural 
models 
Multivariate 




Equally Weighted  European 
Portfolio  LIBOR-OIS SIN 
Liabilities/MV  
    BSI  ΔCoVaR 
US Portfolio  LIBOR-TBILL  SIV  Reduced Portfolio Equally Weighted 
    Liabilities/MV   





Panel A: European Portfolio 
  Granger 
causality test  GG metric  McFadden 
R-squared  Final score 
LIBOR-OIS  0 3 5 8 
PCA  3 3 1 7 
CDO 0  2  –3  –1 
BSI  –1 –3  3 –1 
SIN –1  0  –5  –6 
ΔCoES  –1 –5 –1 –7 




causality yest  GG metric  McFadden 
R-squared  Final score 
PCA  3 4  –3 4 
LIBOR-TBILL 1  –3  5  3 
CDO 0  –1  3  2 
SIV  2 4  –5 1 
BSI –3  1  –1  –3 
ΔCoVaR  –3 –5  1 –7 
This table reports the ranking scores of the systemic risk measures among three classifications: Granger 
causality test, Gonzalo and Granger metric and McFadden R-squared. We also report the final score, which is 
the sum of scores among classifications. Panel A refers to the European portfolio and Panel B to the US 
portfolio. 
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